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In the analysis that follows, a sort of balance sheet will be drawn up of the impact of this authoritarian no-party system in Greece and abroad from the viewpoints of various institutions and organized groups involved as well as of other governments, and also in terms of gainers and losers in a loose set of nonzero-sum games, keeping in mind that in the long run gainers could become losers and losers become gainers.
Gainers
In the Greek arena, the primary gainers were Colonel Papadopoulos and his acolytes in the Union of Young Greek Officers. This group had been conceived a decade or so earlier in a climate, first, of Greek indignation against the policies of Eden and Dulles in the Cyprus question, and, second, of admiration for Nasser's defiance of the West in the national-especially toward friends-when viewed from the perspective of the older social and economic establishment, which it did not destroy.
In line with social ideals expressed in the novel constitutional provisions concgrning the duties of the state toward society as a whole, the regime took steps that favored not only the military and the shipowners but also the wage earners, civil servants, and pensioners. Late in 1972, to the discomfiture of opponents who looked down on the "colonels" as Boeotian boors, the government began wooing intellectuals and artists with pensions and prizes, despite often hardly concealed mutual antipathies. In brief, the regime wielded not only the stick, but also the carrot.
In the Western NATO sector of the international setting, the United States, Turkey, and Italy all gained from the authoritarian no-party system in Athens and its policies. The six-year regime was a period of political stability that ensured the continued alignment of Greece with the United States and its strategic needs not only in the NATO defense area but also beyond it, in the Middle East. In an agreement of January 8, 1973, between the United States Navy and the Hellenic Navy, the Greek government granted home-porting facilities near Athens to the Sixth Fleet, "to serve the purposes of the North Atlantic Alliance."7
The regime's moves in the Cyprus question, which had become a GreekTurkish competition for the control if not the possession of the whole island, turned out to be to the advantage of Turkey. The "colonels," assisted by General George Grivas-Dighenis in Cyprus, and ignoring the advice of the experts on Cyprus in the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs, were largely responsible for the Cyprus crisis of December 1967 which brought Greece to the brink of a war with Turkey. This resulted in the withdrawal of the 8ooo Greek troops who had been sent to Cyprus by George Papandreou's government during an earlier crisis in [1963] [1964] 10 In the abstract, this constitution sought to deal with several specific political issues that involved the monarchy in post-World War II Greece. Thus it included provisions that would have prevented King Paul from appointing Constantine Karamanlis as premier after the death of Alexander Papagos; his wife, Queen Frederika, from running her Queen's fund; their son, Crown Prince Constantine, from getting the education Parliament, and also gave the armed forces a self-governing status in the Greek body politic.
From Rome, King Constantine II had consistently rejected several backstage approaches for some sort of accommodation with the regime in Athens. In 1968 he made it clear that he would not return to Greece if invited to do so, unless all political prisoners were released, censorship was lifted, and free elections were assured. It is not clear whether or not he had backed the attempted coup of certain naval officers late in May 1973; but after his deposition on June 1 1973, he stated that he had absolutely no connection with it. He had never previously condemned the underground activities of organizations using the crown as a symbol of their resistance.
The decision to abolish the monarchy seems to have been made well before the attempted naval coup of May 1973. Several months earlier, Ioannidis, the head of the military police, had informed a number of Greek politicians that the abolition of the monarchy was the price that would have to be paid for the restoration of parliamentary government and the return of the armed forces to their barracks. Junior officers who had sided with the regime during the king's abortive coup of 1967 were said to fear that if he returned to Greece, they would be prosecuted for breach of military discipline because of their fidelity to the "junta." The statement of the secretary of the Greek Communist Party of the Interior, Dimitrios Partsalidis, during his trial in Athens in January 1973, that his party favored the king's return," may well have been a sort of kiss of death for Constantine II and his dynasty.
For the professional politicians and the 300 members of the dissolved Parliament, many of them lawyers, the deprivation of political freedoms was more immediate and equally severe. With the suspension of representative government and the multiparty system, they were shorn of their various political roles. Their aspirations and expectations of becoming ministers or prime ministers were dashed. Their political careers were cut short. What made matters worse were the indignities to which the politicians were subjected under the "colonels," who blamed them for the breakdown of the previous multiparty system, to which the April 21, 1967, revolution had merely administered a coup de gracea view shared by many other Greeks, including some of the politicians themselves.12 Among leading politicians, Panayotis Kanellopoulos, that he did; and their elder daughter, Sophia, from getting a $300,000 dowry out of public funds, on her betrothal to Juan Carlos, the heir presumptive to the Spanish throne.
leader of ERE (National Radical Union) and last precoup premier, was thrown out of office, arrested, placed under house detention, and thereafter kept under constant police surveillance, including even telephone tapping. Other members of his cabinet were subjected to similar treatment. George Papandreou, leader of EK (Center Union), and the members of his party, also were treated in this manner. Papandreou, additionally, felt cheated of the victory he had expected from the never-held elections of May 28, 1967. His son, Andreas, greatly fearing for his life, was imprisoned; he expected a political trial on charges of high treason. Leaders of EDA (Union of the Democratic Left), a faqade for the Greek Communist party (outlawed since 1947), as well as a considerable number of people suspected of having communist sympathies, were deported to isolated islands in the Aegean. These initial measures later were relaxed. Andreas Papandreou was allowed to leave the country at the end of 1967. Late in March 1968 about 5400 of the more than 6ooo persons-mainly members of EDA, communists, and fellow travelerswho had been deported to the island of Yaros in the Northern Cyclades were released. At the end of October 1968 the government announced that this internment camp was soon to be closed.
However, throughout this more than six-year period, censorship and press fears of severe penalties, as well as denial of access to other mass media, paralyzed the efforts of politicians to denounce the coup, express their indignation over the loss of their freedom of speech, and criticize various measures taken by the "colonels." Suspension of the right to organize and assemble impeded their efforts to mobilize their followers against the regime, and left them with no alternative but underground opposition, for which most were ill prepared. These experiences undoubtedly left deep scars in the minds of the Greek political elite. It is no wonder then that the leaders of the three major parties active in Greek politics prior to the coup of April 21, 1967, should have been opposed to the regime. Quite consistently they refused to recognize the validity of the 1968 constitution-which, however, enabled government spokesmen to argue against an early return to a multiparty system.
Other losers were certain high public officials (some elected, like the mayors of Athens and Piraeus), civil servants, professors in institutions of higher education, trade union leaders, and members of the judiciary and the ecclesiastical hierarchy, who were dismissed from their positions. Most of them were not allowed to appeal to the Council of State against their dismissal or forced retirement. Also denied the right to appeal were those persons whose citizenship was withdrawn and whose liament acknowledged that "we were to blame" for the coup and the state of affairs that followed.
property was confiscated on the ground that they had acted "unpatriotically."
The military hierarchy itself was not spared from purges. Well aware of the fundamental importance of maintaining absolute control over the armed forces, the Union of Young Greek Officers, after seizing power, decreed the ex officio retirement of army and gendarmerie officers who were members of ASPIDA. They also proposed to retire some 400 other officers, many of them their superiors, whom they believed to be "unreliable"--loyal primarily to the king or critical of the coup. King Constantine II, however, refused to sign the relevant decree and, counting on the help of several officers threatened with retirement, attempted a coup of his own. When this coup failed, the regime was free to proceed with the original purge with a vengeance-after granting on December 23, 1967, an amnesty to its ASPIDA opponents and those connected with a purge plan of the Papandreou government in 1964! Communists, monarchists, and others apprehended for acts directed against the regime such as political graffiti, oppositionist pamphlets, symbolic violence, or participation in underground organizations, often were ill treated. At times they were psychologically pressured and physically tortured by agents motivated by a desire for advancement or even by sheer sadism. Military courts imposed harsh penalties that civil courts would never have imposed. Temporary releases from prison "because of grave damage to health" were not infrequent-which suggested humanity or inhumanity, depending on the facts of the case and the viewpoint. For example, Lady Fleming, widow of Sir Alexander Fleming, was convicted in 1971 of having taken part in a plot to help Panagoulis, the would-be assassin of Premier Papadopoulos, to escape from prison; later she was freed and then deported from Greece since she was also a British subject.13 A major casualty in the press field was the prestigious conservative Athens paper Kathimerini, together with its subsidiary publications. Its owner and publisher, Helen Vlachos, refused to comply with the rules of preventive censorship and found it financially advantageous, as some members of her staff saw it, to close down the paper instead of following in the footsteps of her father who had wholeheartedly supported the Metaxas dictatorship of August 4, 1936.14 Subsequently the newspaper Ethnos was another casualty. Although in October 1969 censorship prior to publication was abolished, the press law issued in 1970, which was based on article 14 of the 1968 constitution, provided for severe sanctions against its violators. Furthermore, the vagueness of some of [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] | 517 the law's provisions and the uncertainty as to whether military or civil courts maintained jurisdiction over press offenses acted as additional deterrents to freedom of expression in the press. Some opposition papers were treated with greater severity than others. After the overthrow of the Papadopoulos-Markezinis regime in November 1973, the traditionally pro-Karamanlis and pro-king afternoon paper Vradyni was closed without explanation. Earlier the paper had been deprived of governmentsponsored advertisements and on several occasions its representatives had been brought to court because of items published in it. By contrast, the traditionally pro-Papandreou, pro-Venizelos, and pro-republic morning newspaper To Vima was even able to obtain approval for a large loan.
Western Europe and the Greek Regime
All the deprivations imposed by the regime of April 21, 1967, upon its opponents stemmed from its anxious efforts to consolidate its hold on the governmental apparatus and on the country as a whole, and to promote its professed long-range goal of regenerating Greece. Thus, for the regime itself these inroads on personal freedom represented a set of victorious battles. The battles, however, were won with a high cost to the regime's own image, and even more. Silencing opponents at home was one thing; silencing opponents abroad was another. The coup d'etat itself, the suspension of representative government and of political and civil liberties, together with the treatment of the regime's foes, caused, initially at least, quite an outcry not only in the USSR and the Sovietinclined international bloc-which from 1945 on had attacked all Greek governments as "monarcho-fascist" and as "tools of imperialism"-but also among the Western nations. The image of Greece as the "cradle" or "bastion" of democracy was tarnished.
Although On the other hand, the fact that on the day of the coup, its leaders ignored the deputy head of KYP (the Greek equivalent of the CIA) when he arrived at the Greek "Pentagon" with a CIA message for them and also that they subsequently dismissed him and KYP's director from their posts indicates at the least that if CIA collusion was involved, it was definitely not through KYP's leaders. If, however, it is true that for quite a while before 1967 CIA agents in Greece (and perhaps British intelligence agents also) had contacts with Papadopoulos, this would not exclude the possibility that on the night of April 20-21, 1967, he acted on his own, without any CIA authorization, on the assumption of a favorable if not grateful response from the United States government and the CIA for his accomplishment.23
As As the American ambassador to Athens, Henry Tasca, told a commission of lawyers on April 9, 1973, the Greeks were being wooed by the Russians, who were competing with the Chinese for their favor; Greece could purchase arms from France and Germany, and did not have to rely on the United States in this regard. Bulgaria, too, was making overtures to the Greek government. Their economy was good. Greece, moreover, gave the largest percentage of its gross national product to support NATO and had one of the best-trained armies in Europe. It benefited from its strategic location, near the Bosporus and the Middle East. Finally, the Greeks were fiercely nationalistic and resented outside Table 8 .
:30 The collapse of the fasade party, EDA, had an implosive effect on the communist edifice that existed behind it. When the dust settled, the latent if not preexisting conflicts came to the surface between the Greek communist apparatus operating under the guidance and control of Moscow, on the one side, and EDA communists, on the other, who now feared lest they be cast in the role of scapegoats, because of their impotence to react against the military takeover. In During the quadrennial that began in 1967, the average total emigration overseas and to Western Europe did not rise. On the contrary, it declined to 26,ooo and 44,ooo respectively, compared with the average annual emigration during the previous quadrennial of [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] , which amounted to 28,ooo and 75,ooo respectively, and which was higher than it had been even during the preceding quadrennial of 1959-1962.33 Contributing to relatively favorable economic and social conditions All in all, not a small number of Greeks, some of them "influential," seemed to prefer stability and freedom from fear from below, to freedom from fear from above. Some, indeed, considered the dictatorship of "colonels" of mainly peasant origins as less intolerable than the possible alternative of a dictatorship under the king and his generals and "aristocratic" entourage, which the "colonels' coup may well have preempted.
Relief, of course, by its very nature, is short lived. Satisfaction and relaxation followed; then a sort of apathy; then a malaise about the future, even though for the elderly that future was short. And as the "Revolution of April 21, 1967" was advancing toward its sixth anniversary, death was depleting the ranks of these supportive people. Meanwhile, Greeks born in 1952 were reaching the voting age; others born in 1957 reached the student age. 34 The percentage of aged (over sixty-four years) in the population rose from 4 percent in 1870 As the students' riots of February-March and November 1973 were to demonstrate, antiregime attitudes, sentiments, and behavior were forthcoming from among members of the younger age groups. For them war, occupation, and civil strife belonged to the realm of parents' tales. Student demonstrations of 1968 and 1969 in the United States and France served as models for action. However, as in the past, many high school graduates from affluent families were still able to pursue higher education in universities abroad-in Italy, France, Germany, Britain, and even the United States-if they so chose.37 They returned to Greece with vivid experiences in techniques of student organization and action. As for other potentially dynamic elements and social and political malcontents in this age group, they continued to find an outlet for their restlessness and frustration in permanent or temporary emigration. The temporary emigrants came back to Greece with money made abroad, and, in contrast to graduates of foreign universities, were anxious to join the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie,38 which was an important beneficiary of an essentially peasant-to-petty-bourgeois paternalistic dictatorship.
Relaxation of Military Authoritarianism
In response to challenges posed by contact with domestic and international political and other realities, a process of learning by doing had been going on-punctuated at first by frequent blunders. The belief that technocracy would resolve the economic, social, and other problems of Greek society-with all the antipolitical implications of this Saint-Simonian belief-was reflected not only in the constitution of 1968 but also in the inclusion of a large number of civilian experts in succeeding cabinets since 1970 and in efforts to prepare long-range programs for the future of Greece.
During the six years from the coup of April 21, 1967, there had been a cautious but steady downward trend in repressive measures. However, depending on internal and external circumstances, sharp oscillations between relaxation and tightening of the reins occurred at times. In September -197 Premier Papadopoulos announced a step promised by 37 In 1973 the student population of Greece totaled 72,000. At the same time, there were 0o,ooo Greek students in Italy alone. New York Times, November 3, 1973.
38 For temporary emigrants, going abroad was like traveling to a promised land. They hoped to learn a skill there and amass some savings. The bulk of them wanted to return to Greece after spending a few years abroad. E. Dimitras, Enquetes sociologiques sur les emigrants grecs, II (Athens, 1971), pp. 98, loo, io6, and 2i2.
George Papandreou: henceforth certificates of social beliefs, introduced in 1948, and whose conditions had become more stringent after April 21, 1967, would be required only for civil servants. In August 1972, he declared that a massive effort would be exerted in the coming years to modernize the nation's primary and secondary education and to establish more institutions of higher learning. Details published suggested in some respects a reversion to George Papandreou's ambitious program for reforming the antiquated Greek educational system-a program previously considered anathema not only by the "colonels" but also by conservative elements of ERE and the extreme right wing.
After the end of prepublication censorship in 1969, articles critical of various steps taken by the regime appeared in conservative or other opposition newspapers. Also featured were oppositionist cartoons as well as the full proceedings in translation of the congressional hearings of 1971 and 1972 on military supplies to Greece and home-porting facilities, all of which contained statements critical of the regime. Although criticism of Premier Papadopoulos himself was studiously avoided, Vice-Premier Stylianos Pattakos was not spared. Both before and after the plebiscite of 1973 many Athens papers severely criticized the conditions under which the plebiscite was being or had been held: the maintenance of martial law in Athens during the referendum, the prohibition of any public meetings for members of the opposition, the monopoly of radio and television by government spokesmen, the activities of "cultural organization" among the electorate, the recruitment of civil servants and teachers to supervise the polling booths, and the various measures devised by the authorities to ensure the desired outcome of the popular vote.
Of course, political newspapers in the early 1970S were not exciting to read, as they had been before April 21, 1967. By contrast, the headlines of sports papers exploded with "glorious victories" and "ignominious defeats."3'3 A passion for soccer especially seemed to have replaced the passion for politics of the previous era, spreading even to the old. Opponents of the regime asserted that this new passion was only an outlet for pent-up aggressiveness which otherwise would have been expressed in the political arena. The government, in their view, encouraged this passion not so much in order to build up healthy young citizens, 39 A decline Of 14.5 percent in the number of copies of political newspapers occurred in 1970 compared with 1969. By contrast, the number of copies of sports papers declined by only 4.9 percent in those two years (Statistical Yearbook of Greece 1972, p. 309). While the overall decline in both categories must be ascribed to the great expansion of TV during those two years, the greater decline in the number of copies of political newspapers sold may be attributed to the relatively bland character of their contents, because of censorship. but rather to divert from politics the aggressive drives of youth. It played, they said, the imperial Roman game of "bread and circuses."
Meanwhile collections of scarcely veiled critical pieces by Greek writers were published and circulated freely. Bookstores flaunted in their windows not only a biography of Karamanlis but also translations of writings by Herbert Marcuse, Che Guevara, or Roger Garaudy. Newspaper kiosks sold the New York, Herald Tribune, the Times of London, Le Monde, Pravda, and Izvestia (though not left-wing Greek Cypriot newspapers), as well as English, French, and German paperbacks, including pornographic novels. However, the July 1, 1973, issue of the London Observer, which alleged that in 1944 Papadopoulos had served in the security corps set up under German occupation auspices to fight the communist-led resistance forces, and that he later had close ties with the CIA, almost instantly disappeared from newsstands, and no newspaper dared publish this article in translation.40 Earlier, in June 1973, the translator of a book on urban guerrilla warfare was prosecuted.
Six years after the coup of April 21, 1967, the authoritarian political system had become more or less a personal dictatorship. However, it was not of the German, Italian, or Soviet sort-just as Greek democracy had never been of the American, British, French, or Scandinavian brand. As in the previous Greek political systems, the regime's leaders were extremely conscious of family and clientele ties in consolidating their hold over the apparatus of state and in shaping and using this apparatus in order to attain political and other goals. It would indeed have been extremely un-Greek of them (as well as impolitic) had they behaved otherwise. And like Kanellopoulos when starting out on his political career in the 1930s,41 the "colonels" in 1967 swore to do away with rousfetia (favors), other forms of favoritism, and bribery and corruption. Like him, however, they soon found out that rousfetid performed important functions in Greek politics and society, when they had to deal with bureaucratic inefficiency and red tape. The experiment with an ombudsman to help resolve such problems quickly withered away. Further political developments depended, of course, also on the responses of the regime's opponents, who now included some disgruntled members of Papadopoulos' former entourage. Would all these opponents recognize as a political fact the new state of affairs, organize political parties, and, after getting over the hurdle of the Constitutional Court and taking part in the general elections promised for 1974, limit themselves to political opposition within the new constitution's rigid frame-work, seeking to alter it by lawful means? Or would they refuse to have anything to do with this system and even resort to violent methods for expressing their opposition and thus provoke the reimposition of martial law?
The leaders of the two main "bourgeois" parties, ERE and EK, after a period of silence issued statements indicating their inclination to boycott efforts to prepare for elections in 1974. Meanwhile, a ceremony was organized in Athens to commemorate the fifth anniversary of George Papandreou's death. Clashes with the police punctuated this commemoration. Then a group of well-organized militant students occupied the Polytechneion (Athens Institute of Technology), set up a radio transmitter, and began clamoring for the ouster of Papadopoulos, the establishment of democracy, and the departure of the Americans. Martial law was reimposed on November 23. Tanks were ordered to the scene. The rebellious students, who had been joined by other elements, finally were forced to leave the occupied building, but had to run the gauntlet of a not too gentle police. The official death toll was thirteen; however, some people believe that at least fifty lives were lost in this revolt-the second one that year.
The downfall of President Papadopoulos and the seizure of power essentially by Ioannidis, occurred at this juncture. Another military man, General Phaidon Gizikis, commander of the First Army based in Larissa, was sworn in as president of the Republic. In a new constitutional act, his office was shorn of its legislative and reserved powers in national defense, foreign affairs, and public order. The vice-presidency was abolished. A civilian premier, former minister in the Papadopoulos cabinet, Adamantios Androutsopoulos (believed by many Greeks to be a CIA agent) was installed. An all-civilian cabinet was recruited. The restoration of the regime of April 21, 1967, was proclaimed. The return to the multiparty system was put off for the Greek Kalends.
Thus, Papadopoulos' effort to institutionalize if not legitimize his ".guided democracy" for eight more years abruptly came to an end. His attempt to reassert civilian rule over the military-a rule that he himself had flouted in his coup of April 21, i967-had collapsed, as had Markezinis' pragmatic scheme for moving toward some sort of representative government and multiparty system under a constitution which he himself had considered unworkable.
Awareness of Greece's deteriorating economic and financial situation from 1971 
